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1. “The twelve jurors were all writing very busily on 
slates.  
‘What are they all doing?’ Alice whispered to the 
Gryphon. ‘They can’t have anything to put down yet, 
before the trial’s begun.’ 
‘They’re putting down their names’, the Gryphon whispered 
in reply, ‘for fear they should forget them before the 
end of the trial.’ 
‘Stupid things!’ Alice began in a loud, indignant voice; 
but she stopped hastily, for the White Rabbit cried out, 
‘Silence in the court!’ and the King put on his 
spectacles and looked anxiously round, to make out who 
was talking. 
Alice could see, as well as if she were looking over 
their shoulders, that all the jurors were writing down 
‘stupid things!’ on their slates, and she could even make 
out that one of them didn’t know how to spell ‘stupid,’ 
and that he had to ask his neighbour to tell him.”1 
 
2. Man is a social animal. Without other people, we would 
quite simply cease to exist. We need our friends, we need 
our family and we need our workmates – our life is 
created, it grows and changes through and in a constant 
relationship with other people. It is precisely this 
relationship, with what Chomsky and de Waal term a kind 
of ”universal moral grammar”, that constitutes human 
                                                
1 Carroll, Lewis, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, Penguin Classics 
1998, pp. 95-96  
beings and distinguishes them from all other biological 
creatures, perhaps together with some other primates, 
according to more recent research. I would go so far as 
to say that both morals and the ability to live a social 
life are immanent and naturally grounded, contextually 
nuanced but in their deep structure the factors that 
combine to make man a biological creature, regardless of 
race, history and political or social environment. The 
concept of man as nothing but a social construction, and 
society as a kind of matrix, then becomes an anti-
intellectual understanding, based on temporary, 
superficial rationalisations of utilitarianly founded 
deviations from the deep structure. In reality, betrayal 
and love are the two most fundamental driving forces in 
human life, primeval forces that change and consolidate 
man as a social animal and thereby also all social 
relationships, regardless of whether we call them 
friendship, family or nation and regardless of whether 
these social relationships at superficial level, in the 
everyday trivial meeting between human beings, are 
controlled by traditional social conventions (behavioural 
codes) or written conventions (legislation). Man is an 
amalgam of values and, even if the law, as it is 
understood in modern society, is a social construction, 
if it is to function, it is always and eternally 
dependent on sponging on the ”universal moral grammar” 
that constitutes human beings both individually and 
collectively. In its simplest form, this is illustrated 
by the knowledge that is owned by every lawyer with a 
relatively normal intellect; the penal code is written 
for people who have no intention of committing crimes – 
it acts as confirmation for us other that we are doing 
what is right. The criminal is not interested in the 
penal code; the criminal is only interested in the risk 
of being found out and is only worried by the force of 
the ensuing social stigma within his or her own social 
group.  
 
Children follow what we do, not what we say. The same 
thing applies to the authorities – the most successful 
legal metaphor of our modern society – regardless of 
whether this silhouette of human decision-making appears 
in the form of a court, the chancellor of justice, a 
university, the police and so on. By learning, we 
assimilate social convention which modulate, blunt and 
rationalise our own deviations from our inner, biological 
moral compass. We follow convention in order to reduce 
our own discomfort and we refer to convention when we 
deviate from the deep structure, the moral, in casu in 
relation to other people we meet. Convention quite simply 
requires us to lie, when we are asked, for example, about 
a recently purchased dress or what we think of 
Guantanamo, questioned by powerful men and women at a 
cocktail party at the White House. One everyday 
expression of this human frailty, our fear of deviating 
and being ostracised from social fellowship, is our 
tendency always to agree, exhibit solidarity in 
discussions with the person with whom we are speaking, 
when we are expected to express a value judgement about 
an event to which that person is referring. This results 
in short-term survival but also in long-term self-
contempt which can express itself in stress and mental 
illness at individual level and broken, fragmented 
societies at collective level. The attitude we take to 
the social fellowship of which we are a part is a 
prerequisite for survival, regardless of whether we are 
children in a dysfunctional family, citizens of Saddam’s 
Iraq, Stalin’s Soviet Union or Göran Johansson’s 
Göteborg, members of Hells Angels or a professor at a 
department of law; in all these societies, social 
competence becomes the decisive factor for the powerless, 
at the expense of intellectual, empathetic competence. 
The inner moral compass is the same – in these contexts, 
it is still wrong to murder, rape, steal, sponge or even 
lie – and, as a result, the behaviour either focuses 
outwards, towards another social group with the “them-us” 
rationalisation, or else a temporary aberration/emergency 
situation is blamed – I was drunk, she was stupid, they 
were so rich and I was so poor, he lied back in the 1980s 
but he has been nice since then2, it was a “white lie”.  
 
So this inner moral compass is the foundation. In the 
longer term, it plays a decisive part in creating 
effective social fellowship, while convention generates 
the flexibility that is pragmatically essential in order 
to resolve potential relationship conflicts in the 
shorter term. In close social relationships, convention 
plays a less important role, while in more superficial 
social relationships it often plays a decisive part at 
the start of a relationship. Globalisation – which means 
in this context that we meet more and more people and 
make new acquaintances with increasing regularity – is 
therefore tending to make conventionally correct 
behaviour a more frequent part of our everyday lives at 
the expense of honesty. It is this that, during the 
1990s, created what is known as “the cynical generation”, 
which originated from an increasingly large – and more 
clear cut – distinction between rhetoric and practice. In 
the longer term, this erodes the cohesive putty of value 
conformity that constitutes societies and thereby also 
undermines legislation as a conflict-resolving 
instrument. At the end of the day, the effectiveness of a 
                                                
2 See below, p 5., when professor Gregor Noll tries to defend how 
come he suggested Hans Corell as honorary doctor at the Faculty of 
Law, University of Lund 
legal system is dependent on its being complied with 
voluntarily.  
 
So, in order to preserve the law as the best system to 
date when it comes to resolving inter-human conflict in a 
civilised manner, we must understand that democracy, the 
rule of law and human rights are not a question of what 
we write, even less what we say. Human rights cannot be 
equated with fancy conferences, cocktail parties or the 
writing of handsome international conventions. Democracy, 
the rule of law and human rights are exclusively a 
question of what we do. Human rights mean concretising, 
seeing other people, focusing on other peoples’ rights 
instead of on our own. Every other position is counter-
productive and this kind of hypocrisy only promotes the 
kind of cynicism that tears societies apart.  
 
3. Anyone who seriously studies a legal rule always 
automatically creates a picture of what would happen in 
the area in question if this legal rule were fully 
implemented.3 This is the way the brain works: what is 
read is always translated into a relatively concrete 
imaginary picture. People are quite simply incapable of 
thinking in only abstract terms – thinking then becomes 
meaningless.  
 
This is the theme upon which advertising plays and this 
is the objective of brand creation – to create a picture 
in the mind of the observer, a myth if you prefer, of 
what will happen if he or she follows the recommendations 
in the advertisements or attempts to conform with the 
                                                
3 See Töllborg, Dennis, Personalkontroll. En ideologikritisk studie 
kring den svenska personalkontrollkungörelsen, Stockholm/Lund 1986, 
p. 56. Also Bruun, Niklas, Kollektivavtal och rättsideologi, Vammala 
1979, p. 43, Pasukanis, Eugen, Almen retslære og marxisme, Köpenhamn 
1975, p. 45, and Strömholm, Stig, Rätt, rättskällor och 
rättstillämpning, Lund 1984, p. 23 
brand. The same thing applies to ideological distortions 
– ideologies are ideologies precisely because they create 
images of reality and, when the powers that be use 
legislation as a means of control, the aim is normally to 
provide an indication of the desirable concrete 
behaviour.  
 
I would like to develop this in more detail. For citizens 
and for legal scholars, the norm is transformed into an 
image of reality, the moment they study it with any 
degree of interest. The same transformation takes place 
when we read a fictional text. If we did not create these 
images, our response to the book would be totally 
indifferent; it would consist of nothing but a collection 
of letters following one another in a certain order. The 
book, the narrative, would be empty and meaningless in 
its capacity as a literary work.4  
 
As I see it, the image creation of the sociocultural 
world is just as important when we study factual 
descriptions and instructions as it is when we read 
fiction. If we read an historical account of Elizabeth I, 
it is only interesting when the historical account is 
concretised in our heads in the form of physical images. 
Norms are translated into images of reality in the same 
way in order to give them meaning. For this reason, 
                                                
4 This is perhaps the background to the widespread autism in modern 
jurisprudence. The third hegemonic revolution, the internet (the 
first two took place in 1789 and 1968), in 1998, has impacted us to 
such a degree that even classical legal arguments, such as 
proprietary rights, become empty and meaningless, as concepts of this 
kind in the internet hegemony are pure abstractions. As we are unable 
to translate what happens into mechanics, we seek solace in 
corresponding metaphors, such as matrices, that state that everything 
is nothing but a construct. The problem, apart from the fact that 
this is not true, is that, in the longer term, we create not only 
legislation that is worthless but also people that are worthless; in 
other words, man commits hegemonic suicide and ceases to be both a 
social creature and an individual. Nothing exists any longer, 
everything is just matrix.  
people never accept or reject a norm as it stands. We 
must always translate it into an image of reality which 
we can then consider and evaluate. It is here, in this 
transformation process, that legislation takes on the 
quality of ideology. This relationship, the ideological 
quality of legislation, is independent of whether the 
distortions that arise during the transformation process 
originate from misunderstandings, conspiracy or 
structural relationships.  
 
The remainder of my argument is based on the fundamental 
supposition that the functionality of a legal system is 
dependent first and foremost on its being complied with 
voluntarily. To the superficial observer, this statement 
appears to be a paradox – is it possible to ask which 
power, class, individual or subject or, to be more 
correct, which interest5 wishes to be in control and why 
it needs to do so in legal form, when the system is 
nonetheless based on voluntary compliance? This perceived 
voluntary compliance may, however, be based on an 
ideologically6 distorted perception of reality. In this 
case, the voluntary compliance is based on false 
presuppositions.  
 
The self-discipline a legal system can generate has a 
decisive impact on stability and stability is beneficial 
for interests and individuals with established positions.7 
If a legal system is to be effective as a control 
                                                
5 What I mean is that we should not begin by talking about 
individuals but about interests and that by far the most important 
interest is the need for stability. This particular interest also 
benefit certain individuals, those with established positions, and, 
in addition to being a collective interest, it is therefore also an 
individual interest for certain people. 
6 Ideology is in this essay understood in the meaning used by the 
Frankfurt School (critical theory), with Horkheimer, Adorno, 
Benjamin, Marcuse and Habermas as the most well-known representatives 
7 Eriksson, Lars D., Marxistisk teori och rättsvetenskap, Helsingfors 
1980, p. 45 
mechanism, it must, however, be established with and 
accepted by “the controlled”, both as a concept and in 
its design at macro level. Power, or interest, if you 
prefer, requires legitimacy. A legal system can provide 
this legitimacy if and only if it is perceived as 
substantially objective and fair.8 Power therefore 
understands how important it is that the majority of the 
“controlled” feel that the exercise of power appears to 
be consistent with the law in force at the time.9  
 
In my introduction, I claimed that man is an amalgam of 
values. I would now like to take things one step further 
and claim that all legal processes are also an amalgam of 
values, as the most fundamental rules in every legal 
system must be based on contextually common values, if 
they are to realise the need for voluntary compliance.  
These rules, or at least the most fundamental ones, such 
as not killing or benefiting from one’s own wrong-doing, 
reflect and, if the legal system is to attain legitimacy, 
also must reflect a mode of behaviour which would be 
followed spontaneously, even without a legal system. Many 
people, including the Swedish forensic sociologist Håkan 
Hydén, call these rules self-generating norms.10 As the 
legislation in these fundamental rules largely confirms 
the manner in which we would nonetheless behave, it 
acquires a special strength as an instrument for 
controlling human behaviour. The law is fair and so it is 
only fair to follow the law. Suddenly, complying with the 
law acquires an intrinsic value – “countries must be 
created by legislation,“ someone claims – and we feel 
                                                
8 Strömholm, Stig, Rätt, rättskällor och rättstillämpning, Lund 1984, 
p. 376. Also Mathiesen, Thomas, Rätt, samhälle och politisk handling, 
Lund 1980, p. 101 
9 Stjernqvist/Widerberg, Introduktion i rättsociologi, Lund 1978, p. 
35 
10 Hydén, Håkan, Rättssociologi som rättsvetenskap, Lund 2002, Chapter 
6 and 8 
that we must obey the law, quite simply because it is the 
law.  
 
At this point, legislation can start to be used to 
influence our behaviour. We must not simply refrain from 
killing people, stealing or committing rape, rules only 
confirming values we already have and which, hence, are 
spontaneously perceived as morally correct or fair. We 
should also refrain from tax evasion, exceeding the speed 
limit, hiding refugees and so on – rules of this type 
obtain their legitimacy only because they are legal rules 
and they are not based on general values but instead on a 
single value: the law should be complied with. These 
rules obtains its legitimacy from the fact that they are 
pragmatically acceptable or, in other words, suitable. So 
these rules acquire their legitimacy from what has become 
convention: we should comply with the law because 
otherwise “anarchy” will take over and so on.  
 
Certain parts of the legal system are made up of rules 
that could be said to have developed from inter-human 
practice, like the paths in a forest. It is these rules I 
call self-generating, rules that most people obey 
voluntarily, regardless of coding. In spite of this, they 
are largely coded and incorporated in the legal system. 
This has a significant impact on the legitimacy of the 
legal system per se; when the self-generating norms are 
coded, this creates a basis for the impression that legal 
control is intrinsically fair and necessary. This 
legitimacy then applies to all the rules that are 
included in the legal system, even those that are not a 
spontaneously established part of citizens’ lives and 
perceptions of justice.11 These “pragmatically accepted” 
                                                
11 See also Bruun, Niklas, Kollektivavtal och rättsideologi, Vammala 
1979, p. 43 
rules could be described as “sponging” on the self-
generating norms.  
 
It is naturally impossible to disregard the constant 
interaction that is taking place between the legal system 
and the population’s perceptions of justice, at least to 
some degree. A rule that initially lacks spontaneous 
acceptance can eventually be regarded as just, as a 
result of the hegemony of the legal system as a conflict-
solving instrument. In spite of this, the citizens’ 
acceptance of the legal system is still dependent on the 
rule being applied in accordance with what the citizens 
perceive it to contain. If the actual application 
deviates markedly from the perceived content – if the 
brand promises quality but what is sold is obvious 
rubbish – and this encompasses a sufficient number of 
rules to constitute a critical mass, the legal system 
will lose legitimacy and thereby also voluntary 
compliance, resulting in a subsequent loss of 
effectiveness. To reach this point, the citizens must, 
however, be empirically aware that the rule essentially 
only has an ideological content, that, in its 
application, it gives the appearance of some degree of 
practice, while the actual relationship can in fact be 
the reverse. This is where legislation as an ideology 
comes into the picture and thereby also critical theory 
(as understood by the Frankfurt School) – not to mention 
the scientist’s honour.12  
 
4. The law constitutes a natural field for resistance. On 
the one hand, the law contains power, anti-
intellectuality, the exercise of power that discharges 
those exercising it from responsibility, social 
                                                
12 Töllborg, Dennis, Science for sale, www.toellborg.nu: dennis 
töllborg: nyheter, speech at the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 
Abuse and Misconduct in Science, November 24 2006, also forthcoming 
conformity and so on, but, on the other hand, it also 
contains reflexivity, contextually united values, 
procedural forms that increase the opportunity for 
civilised solutions to inter-human conflicts with a call 
for mutual respect, the restitution of disrupted balance 
and so on. With the view of human beings I have outlined 
above, critical theory, as it is formulated by 
Horkheimer, Adorno et cetera, becomes a kind of moral 
duty in favour of man as a social creature and against 
autocratic structures, wherever and however they appear. 
In critical theory, anarchy and law find one another, in 
social integration and anarchos (”without authority”). 
They do not constitute a contradiction, they are instead 
united in one another in the common concept of honour or, 
following Habermas, Verständlichkeit (comprehensibility), 
Wahrheit (truth), Richtigkeit (correctness) and 
Wahrhaftigkeit (honesty).   
 
”Critical ideology analysis always involves an external 
perspective of the law. The law is examined as an 
objective structure and not on the legal system’s and the 
players’ internal understanding of themselves. … Legal 
dogmatic constitutes a means of rational argumentation 
within the system. The actual prerequisite for legal 
dogmatic is the minimum of confidence in the legislator 
that comes from the interpreter assuming that the 
legislator knows what he/she is doing and means what 
he/she says. There is scope for criticism and different 
opinions within the system, but the criticism does not go 
so far as to question the ideology and fundamental 
prerequisites of the system. It is not possible to argue 
within a system and at the same time claim that the 
players in the system do not know what they are doing or 
do not mean what they say. If people wish to argue within 
a system that contains ideological misrepresentations, 
they must either be naïve or suppress the insight and 
awareness they have of the ideological 
misrepresentations. If they are unable or unwilling to do 
this, they must leave the system and become part of 
critical ideology analysis as a scientific approach, 
whether they like it or not.”13  
 
According to Mathiesen, the ideological 
misrepresentations work by “branding image creation”14. In 
other words, the ideology functions as a cohesive putty; 
through its cognitive impact, it is the most central 
instrument – clearly surpassing naked violence – for 
stability in the creation of society.  
 
Like every other scientist, also scientist’s using 
critical ideology analysis is naturally controlled by 
implicit and, to him/her, unknown prerequisites. 
Moreover, we know that interest biases knowledge 
production and that knowledge is dependent on context. 
The critical ideology analysis explicit interest in 
knowledge is emancipatory. Only a negatively defined 
picture of reality can avoid ideological 
misrepresentation. The negation of negation15, a kind of 
ultradialectic approach with constant criticism and 
constant reconstruction of knowledge of both subject and 
object and their relationship to one another, is the 
methodological key. Constant dissidence, permanent 
resistance, is another way of expressing the same thing. 
Negative becomes the keyword of critical theory, not in 
the sense of resignation or nihilism, but in the sense of 
non-confirmatory, useless for the purposes of legitimacy. 
                                                
13 Christensen, Anna, Ideologikritik contra dogmatik, in Hydén (ed), 
Rätten som instrument för social förändring, Lund 1982 
14 ”stämplande bildskapande”, Mathiesen, Thomas, Makt och motmakt, 
Göteborg 1982, p. 112 
15 Cf. Israel, Joachim, Språkets dialektik och dialektikens språk, 
Arlöv 1980 
The dialectic comes from constantly demonstrating a lack 
of completeness where completeness is claimed, as Said 
puts it, refusing to accept the stereotypes and 
simplified categorisations that impose such powerful 
restrictions on human thinking and human communication, 
constantly concretising and being awkward, argumentative 
and even unpleasant.16  
 
To sum up, my claim is that the law has a tendency to act 
ideologically – in other words, a change at legal level 
can lend legitimacy to activities, without the legal 
change actually bringing about the anticipated 
corresponding change in the practical performance of 
these activities. From my speciality, intelligence and 
pro-active policing, the ban on the registration of 
political views and affiliations is one such example,17 
the communication rule in its different forms in §13 of 
the Personnel Control Ordinance another,18 the lifting in 
1999 of the absolute secrecy in the Official Secrets Act 
when it comes to the information in the security police 
register a third.19 It is therefore a central scientific 
task  – in actual fact, a scientific obligation, at least 
for legal and political scientists – critically to 
examine the degree to which the rhetoric the legal change 
reflects also has any real practical repercussions. This 
is particularly central in a social system in which power 
bases its legitimacy on references to value arguments 
which are linked to the concept of the superiority of 
democratic rule; in other words, a system whose most 
                                                
16 Said, Edward, Den intellektuelles ansvar, Smedjebacken 1995, p. 28 
17 Töllborg, Dennis, Under Cover. Den svenska säkerhetspolisen och 
dess arbetsmetoder, Göteborg 1991, pp. 49-50 
18 Töllborg, Dennis, Personalkontroll. En ideologikritisk studie kring 
den svenska personalkontrollkungörelsen, Stockholm/Lund 1986, pp. 
317-333 
19 Cameron/Töllborg, Internal Security in Sweden, pp. 198-200, in 
Brodeur/Gill/Töllborg, Democracy, Law and Security. Internal security 
services in contemporary Europe, Hampshire/Burlington 2003 
powerful cohesive force is voluntary acceptance. Because 
every acceptance of this kind is always ultimately based 
on a conception of the actual state of things and more 
rarely on an empirical analysis. In the modern version of 
these social systems, science therefore plays a decisive 
part in the confidence those who are controlled have in 
the actual state of things, science as an instrument of 
legitimacy and the scientist as the tool for diverting 
issues and knowledge that are sensitive to hegemony.20  
 
5. But so what? Stability as the prevailing norm is also 
a rational objective and it can certainly be regarded as 
legitimate – and very convenient – even among scientists 
– to participate in a classical cover-up (such as 
Aleksander Peczenik21 and Kurt Grönfors22 have advocated 
within the legal system and Olof Peterson within 
political science23, to mention at random three of all the 
people who could possibly be mentioned). However, as a 
scientist, in fact even as a legal scientist, it is 
possible to focus on and spotlight the empirics and then 
allow them to reflect against the values that are 
represented by the legal system and upon which powerful 
men and women base their positions and then – time and 
again – focus on the most central question, namely: To 
                                                
20 This explains why I am so furious with the Departments of Law in 
Stockholm and Lund, which give Corell legitimacy like just any 
necrologist over the greatest swine ever to have lived. By doing 
this, history is not simply Stalinised. The lawyers of tomorrow are 
brought up in hypocrisy, an upbringing that will have a disastrous 
impact in the longer term when it comes to the legitimacy of the 
legal system. And what comes instead? See further Töllborg, Dennis, 
Science for sale, www.toellborg.nu: dennis töllborg: nyheter, also 
forthcoming, speech at the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Abuse 
and Misconduct in Science, November 24 2006 
21 Cf. Prof. Peczenik’s arguing for “logical jumps” as soon as a 
anomaly was disturbing the work with explaining the legal system as a 
unity. Peczenik, Aleksander, “Vad är rätt?, om demokrati, 
rättssäkerhet, etik och juridisk argumentation”, Stockholm 1995 
22 Prof. Grönfors used to state, for the researchstudents and at 
seminars, that the most important task for legal science was to act 
as the grease in the legal machinery. He expresses this view with a 
little more elegance in Grönfors, Kurt, Avtalslagen, Göteborg 1995 
23 Petersson, Olof, Den offentliga makten, Stockholm 2007 
what is this the answer? No one is more than me aware 
that this is a (controversial) choice, but choosing to 
look away is also a choice;  
 
* On 2 June 2007, Hans Corell was made an honorary doctor 
of law in a solemn ceremony at the Department of Law at 
Lund University.24 He had been nominated by Gregor Noll, 
who first denied having made this nomination, then 
claimed that the procedure was classified as secret25 and 
finally explained to a former student via e-mail that 
Corell’s sins were a thing of the past.26 Otherwise, 
Corell was well known, not least at the Faculty of Law in 
Lund, since 1997, when it was disclosed that, in his 
capacity as the government’s legal representative, he had 
deliberately misled the European Court of Justice in the 
so-called Leander case.27 The Swedish government was 
subsequently forced both to publicly apologise to Leander 
and to give him a sum corresponding to € 43,000 in tax-
free damages for this action. Following the main 
negotiations in the European Court of Justice in 1986, 
Corell was offered the post of Head of the Secret 
Service, an offer he was not content to accept. Instead, 
he demanded – successfully – that Sweden should lobby for 
him to be appointed as the Deputy Secretary-General of 
the UN, with special responsibility for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. A decade later, in December 1997, 
                                                
24 Juridiska fakultetsstyrelsen, Lunds universitet, 2006-12-13 
25 e-mail to me from Gregor Noll 2007-04-24 
26 e-mail to me from Naiti Del Sante 2007-09-10 
27 ECHR Leander ./. Sweden, appl no 9248/81. See also Töllborg, 
Dennis, The Leander case in reflection when we know the true story, 
in Töllborg, Dennis (ed), National Security and the Rule of Law, 
Göteborg 1997, pp. 179-197. The background is well known to the 
Faculty of Law in Lund, not only because I, who was Leander’s legal 
representative, wrote my dissertation there and my supervisor, Anna 
Christensen, was a professor at the same faculty, but also as a 
result of the articles in two festschrifts in which this matter was 
discussed, both to Anna Christensen in 2000, Normativa Perspektiv, 
Festskrift till Anna Christensen, Lund 2000, and to Reinhold Fahlbeck 
2005, Liber Amicorum, the second of which was actually published by 
the faculty’s publishers! 
when he was interviewed in The Guardian about the lies in 
the European Court of Justice, he explained that he had 
only been obeying orders.28 Five years later, when he 
retired and left his post, he was interviewed by lawyers 
from Lund. They asked him, “What do you regret most?” and 
he replied “I can’t think of anything in particular.”29 He 
now travels around, as an honorary doctor at both the 
Faculty of Law in Stockholm and the Faculty of Law in 
Lund, and explains that ”whatever you do, you must be 
able when you do it to look yourself in the face and 
stand up for what you do. Because, when you start to turn 
a blind eye to your integrity, you are skating on very 
thin ice”.30 This materialized hypocrisy is all well-known 
facts in Sweden, at least among lawyers looking to make a 
career within government agencies. It perhaps explains 
what happened in 2005, when the Swedish Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs was caught with its trousers down after 
also having lied to the UN Committee against Torture 
about the deportation of two Egyptians.31 How else is it 
possible to understand that normally honourable, hard-
working civil servants at a government department decide 
to lie to a UN committee – in an area in which Sweden has 
otherwise always maintained a high profile?  
 
* The tsunami on 26 December 2004 hit Sweden very hard. 
Since 13 October 2005, the Swedish Criminal Investigation 
Department’s list of missing and identified deceased 
persons following the catastrophe in South-East Asia 
comprises 543 persons, of whom 122 are children aged 15 
and under. The criticism was devastating, not least when 
it came to the passive approach of the Swedish 
                                                
28 Walker, EU rights law rests on Swedish lies, The Guardian December 
30, 1997 
29 Interview with Corell, 10 December 2002, 
www.af.lu.se/interaf/pub/Formated.cgi?sel=id=667&fmt=upfnews/EnNyhet 
30 http://ourmotherthemountain.blogspot.com/2007/09/integritet.html 
31 http://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/article287960.ab 
authorities. The first victim of this criticism was 
Christina Palm who, at the time of the tsunami, was Head 
of the Consular Section at the Swedish Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs and, in this capacity, was one of the 
first people the subordinate civil servant contacted when 
the scale of the catastrophe became apparent. Her 
reaction was to give this subordinate a dressing-down, 
telling him not to be “so hysterical” and giving him a 
“serious reprimand”. When Palm’s actions became known and 
the relatives became incredibly upset for obvious 
reasons, she was forced to resign. The then Minister of 
Justice appointed her friend and subordinate as consul – 
in Phuket!32 
 
So what is this the answer to? That the people who 
exercise power are evil? I do not think so. I think it is 
worse than that. What has happened is that ignorance has 
become the norm for success and that this limitation in 
the ability for mutual social interaction, imagination, 
empathy and perceptual ability, resulting from people not 
being required to take responsibility, has been 
internalised to such a degree that the men and women of 
power no longer reflect on whether and, if so, how their 
decisions impact their fellow human beings. They do not 
see, hear or feel. Within medicine, this is known as 
autism and, in an autistic society, the law becomes 
shallow and is simply a form with no content.  
 
“’When did you begin?’ 
The Hatter looked at the March Hare, who had followed him 
into the court, arm-in-arm with the Dormouse.  
‘Fourteenth of March, I think it was,’ he said. 
‘Fifteenth,’ said the March Hare. 
‘Sixteenth,’ added the Dormouse. 
                                                
32 http://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/article334497.ab 
‘Write that down,’ the King said to the jury, and the 
jury eagerly wrote down all three dates on their slates, 
and then added them up, and reduced the answer to 
shillings and pence.”33 
 
                                                
33 Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, p. 97 (Penguin 
Classics 1998) 
